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The Potential for U.S. Economic
Dominance
Guy Poitras*
What does the future hold for U.S. economic dominance throughout the Americas?
The prospect of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005 has once
again pushed the basic issue about U.S. power in Latin America to the forefront of interAmerican relations in the post-Cold War world. The extent and nature of U.S. power in
Latin America has always been controversial and debatable (Lowenthal, 1987; Poitras,
1990; Pastor, 1992; Smith, 2000). In the post-Cold War world, the status of the United
States as a hegemon in the Americas and as the "last" superpower basking in its "unipolar
moment" is central to issues about states, markets, structure, leadership, integration, and
regionalism in the world political economy. Free trade and economic liberalism are not
politically neutral on these issues. They do reflect trends in the hemisphere as well as they
affect the economic gains and the political fates of states.
"Dominance" is a term loaded with pejorative implications. It does not necessarily
mean that dominance produces only asymmetric results. It is also not the same as hegemony. Hegemony requires dominance but not the other way around. The United States
may be or may become dominant in its relations with Latin America without necessarily
being hegemonic as it is in North America.
Asymmetry of power is common to dominance and hegemony. In a hegemonic system, the single great power is so preponderant that it has the ability and willingness to
establish rules of exchange without sharing widely that decision with other states. In
other words, the United States would be overwhelming in its ability to influence the
behavior of others. Dominance also rests on an asymmetry of power, but it is a matter of
degree. It suggests that the great power shares decisions with others but it may exercise a
"veto" or an otherwise privileged voice in its relations with others. Dominance provides
more options to the smaller states than does hegemony. Neither hegemony nor dominance assumes that exchange or relations between the powerful and the not so powerful is
a simple zero sum game. Absolute and relative gains are available to more than the great
power, but they may not be allocated in the same way or to the same extent to everyone.
U.S. power in Latin America is heavily dependent upon four factors: structure,
exchange, soft power, and leadership. First, power is structural. In this modified realist
view, U.S. power is based on market size, population, productivity, technological innova-
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tion, information, capital accumulation, and other considerations. Second, power is a
relationship, a process of exchange. A great power with no contact with others cannot
dominate them except only indirectly. Therefore, power is relative to other states in the
mutual exchange of values. Less exchange means less opportunity to use power to affect
outcomes. This is quite evident in the different power relations between the United States
and North America, on the one hand, and between the United States and South America,
on the other. Third, U.S. power goes beyond structure. Ideology and perceptions affect
the power relationship. This "soft power" is the ability to get others to agree with one's
policies or ide6logies. For example, if Latin America accepts U.S. views on a Pan
American approach to market style liberalism then the United States has more of a golden opportunity to influence and even manage hemispheric integration. Fourth, U.S.
power must be applied. This is especially true in an initiative like the FTAA. A dominant
or even hegemonic state must lead in order to use its resources to achieve desired outcomes. Without leadership on policy issues, the powerful state may miss opportunities to
actively shape the outcome it prefers. Structure, exchange, soft power, and leadership are
all a part of U.S. power.
The potential for U.S. economic dominance in the Americas, as mediated through the
FTAA, will be addressed in several ways. First, the United States as a regional hegemon in
North America and perhaps a dominant leader in the Americas is based on its liberal ideology of subregional integration in the North and its Pan American strategy of hemispheric integration in the Americas as a whole. Second, the influence that the United
States is able to bring to bear on the process of creating a FTAA is to some extent indicative of its ability to dominate the management of hemispheric integration. Third, U.S.
leadership in the Americas could greatly affect the ability of the "colossus to the north" to
influence or dominate the outcomes of a FTAA. Structural asymmetry is not enough. The
U.S. leadership issue, grounded in the domestic struggle over policy, could be the most
important influence on designing state-led initiatives such as the FTAA.
Finally, U.S. dominance is not just about what the United States does. It is also about
what others have and what others do. The global South in the Americas, particularly
Brazil and its Mercado de sur (MERCOSUR) partners, is practicing a mixed strategy in
which the benefits of U.S.-dominated regionalism are balanced against the benefits of
diversifying relations with extra hemispheric states. In other words, trilateral and multilateral exchanges in the global South can affect the ability of the United States to influence
the course of free trade in the Americas.

I. The Pan American Track.
The United States adopted economic regionalism as its own toward the end of the
twentieth century. Supporting the European Union for many years was one thing; devising its own regional integration agreements (RIA) was something else again. The
Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in the late 1980s and the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of the early 1990s were crafted to apply, imperfectly of
course, the liberal policies and free market principles closer to home where they could be
adopted more readily among its two junior partners. The United States did not impose
NAFTA on North America but it clearly had an inordinate and even hegemonic influence
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on North America's adherence to the disciplines and principles favored by the United
States. Free trade, reciprocity, national treatment of investment, domestic trade policy,
dispute settlement, labor and environment protection, and liberalization of services as
well as agriculture were NAFTA tenets. The fact that the United States got virtually everything it wanted, with some exceptions, in NAFTA is clearly indicative that NAFTA was a
U.S.-led RIA, a symbolic and genuine innovation that more formally organized North
America with the United States at its geoeconomic hub.
As a member of the global South, Mexico is the regional outlier. As such, Mexico made
far more concessions than either of the other two prior to joining NAFTA. Mexico's place
in North America did more than that; it also raises issues about the tradeoffs involved in
integrating more closely developed and developing economies. This is what made NAFTA
so consequential for the possibility of linking the global North and the global South in
the Americas. If NAFTA were to be a model for the Americas, the Americas would have to
contend with issues and policies on trade liberalization in services as well as agriculture,
reciprocity in foreign investment, intellectual property rights, standardization of competition policy, government procurement, antidumping and countervailing duties, labor
and environmental protection, and other matters.
The United States has long championed a Pan American vision of a liberal, democratic,
capitalist hemisphere based on precepts long held to be sacrosanct among its public and
private leaders. Historically, this Pan American vision of hemispheric unity and integration was the U.S. preference for Latin America. Integrating North and South America or
at least bringing them closer together meant allowing for a substantial role in Latin
America for U.S. power and policy.
This vision of a U.S.-centered hemisphere was exactly what many in Latin America had
feared for more than a century. Rather than a hemisphere led by the great power in the
north, Latin American preferences gravitated toward a rather different vision of how the
hemisphere should be managed. This vision, inspired by Simon Bolivar, was dedicated to
Latin American rather than hemispheric unity. In its most recent incarnations, this vision
of a united Latin America implied the need for economic (and therefore political) cooperation to the exclusion of the United States (Rocha Valencia, 1997, p. 117). Keeping the
United States at arms length was for decades the central premise of Latin American states
bent upon their own views of security and development strategy. The rest of North
America was seen as being different. Until Canada joined the Organization of American
States in 1989, it was peripheral to the Americas. Of course, Mexico subscribed to the
Bolivaran tradition along with its Latin American cohorts for many years. However, in the
end, its special although sometimes distant relationship with the United States gradually
led to its official entry into North America in 1994. NAFTA revived Pan Americanism for
North America even as it sent messages about the possibilities and challenges of applying
Pan Americanism throughout the Americas.
The idea that economic regionalism linking the North and the South would be the
defining issue in inter-American relations at the beginning of the twenty-first century is
therefore something of a vindication for the U.S. vision. In this sense, U.S. influence on
the agenda for creating a neoliberal inter-American region is on the ascendancy. But it is
not merely a triumph of U.S. preferences for Pan Americanism. Both the North and the
South in the Americas have designed their own subregional enterprises as well. The sub-
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regional or Bolivaran vision of RIAs preceded the Pan American one. However, neither
has precluded the other.
For the United States, organizing a RIA in North America was a strategy more than an
ultimate goal. Befitting its global status, it had a more ambitious agenda for the world
economy beyond its own neighborhood. The United States pursued two tracks in economic regionalism during the waning years of the twentieth century. One was a North
American or continental track; this was the North American variant of the Bolivaran tradition in the south. The second track is Pan American. By 1993, the Clinton administration had committed itself to NAFTA. The "three amigos" (as Prime Minister Chretien
dubbed the North American Three in 1994) put each other as their number one priority
in regional trade negotiations during the early 1990s.
It is not difficult to discern the logic in this agenda. As a unipolar region, North
America had unique advantages; its hegemonic structure made NAFTA an obvious first
step for a free trade area. The bond between the United States and Mexico is so unique
even now that it resembles in some ways the economic relations between two developed
countries (Gonzalez and Velez, 1995). After NAFTA, trade dependence and other economic relations are even greater than before. The steep concessions that Mexico had to
make to gain admittance to this exclusive North American club were palatable to most
Mexicans because the two highly interdependent economies made structure and policy
more congruent. The same is not true of the hemisphere in general.
In the early 1990s, the Pan American track had not been forgotten. Indeed, President
Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) in 1990 was proclaimed at about the
same time that Mexico publicly broached the idea of a far-reaching trade agreement
between Mexico and the United States, which later evolved into the trilateral agreement
including Canada. In 1991, presidential aspirant Bill Clinton had endorsed the Pan
American idea for free trade. After NAFTA came into force in 1994, economic diplomacy
turned toward the inter-American issues of democracy, human rights, sustainable development, poverty reduction, and private initiative as highlighted in the EAI. The
"Declaration of Principles" at the Miami Summit of 1994 was similar in spirit and scope
to this earlier U.S. initiative (Declaration of Principles, 1997). Four years later at the
Santiago Summit, thirty-four countries committed themselves to a negotiating framework to bring about the Pan American vision of the FTAA. Both north and south in the
Americas had moved closer together; the United States had accepted economic regionalism after years of preferring multilateralism or bilateralism in trade liberalization. Latin
America had come to accept Pan Americanism, at least in principle, without jettisoning
entirely the Bolivaran approach to economic unity.
During the mid-1990s, the United States entertained the view that NAFTA would be
the vehicle for the more ambitious project of building a RIA for the entire hemisphere. It
did not quite work out that way. The idea was to widen or broaden NAFTA by including
new members through the accession clause. At the time, Chile was thought to be the most
likely, and most ready, potential new member. What happened, of course, is that NAFTA
did not expand; Chile became an associate member of MERCOSUR, and NAFTA was
bereft of support as the vehicle for creating a FTAA.
Rather than using NAFTA per se to lay the institutional framework for the FTAA, the
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United States came to the view that NAFTA would not be a feasible vehicle for the FTAA.
At most, NAFTA could possibly be used to some extent as a model rather than as a vehicle. From the U.S. perspective, the principles and policies behind NAFTA would become
the essential building blocks of a FTAA. The argument here seems to be that what is good
and possible for North America is also good and possible for the Americas. A U.S.-led
NAFTA could therefore become a U.S.-led FTAA, relying upon NAFTA as a precedent for
linking the global North and the global South on a more ambitious scale. Arguably,
NAFTA has already served as a stimulant to subregionalism within South America. Brazil
was clearly not very enthusiastic about NAFTA as foundation for the FTAA (Purcell, 1998,
p. 94). After all, Brazil's leadership in MERCOSUR is part of geoeconomic strategy casting
a skeptical eye toward the potential of growing U.S. influence in South America. Rather,
Brazil's goal seems to make sure that the FTAA does not become the Trojan horse for U.S.
dominance in South America.

II. The FTAA Process.
The process of negotiating the FTAA also reveals, even in the slow early stages, the
degree of U.S. influence in moving the hemisphere toward a hemispheric RIA. Unable to
expand NAFTA throughout the hemisphere for domestic and regional reasons, the United
States took positions at the various summits of the Americas and in the establishment of
the structure for negotiating the FTAA that reflected its ability as well as the constraints
on its ability to shape the process to suit its own preferences. Clearly, the United States
would be a dominant player, but it would hardly get everything its own way, at least in the
early stages of the FTAA process.
Economic summitry got the ball rolling. At the Miami Summit in 1994, the thirty-four
states adopted the "Declaration of Principles.' This pronouncement went beyond trade
and even economics. The parties pledged to preserve and strengthen the democracies of
the Americas, to promote prosperity through free trade and integration, to eradicate
poverty and discrimination, and to practice sustainable development (Feinberg, 1997:
Appendix D). The Miami Summit did more than proclaim lofty principles. It also gave
impetus to the Pan American vision of liberal regionalism. The U.S. goals at Miami clearly went beyond trade as well. Politics and economics were linked together. Specifically,
democracy was linked to economic liberalism. Beyond that, pushing for a FTAA rested
upon two U.S. preferences; NAFTA's scope and disciplines were to be used as benchmarks
for the FTAA, and the negotiations would take place outside existing hemispheric institutions (Feinberg, 199 7, p. 132).
The architecture for negotiating the FTAA was forged out of compromise and reality.
The United States got some of what it wanted but not everything it wanted. There are
three tiers in the process: the trade ministerials, the working groups, and the Trilateral
Committee based on three regional organizations. The trade ministers carry most of the
responsibility for the "big" or macro decisions and for lending their substantial political
weight to getting the process started. The second tier in the architecture is the working
groups. These groups would do much of the "heavy lifting" in technical areas by initiating
study projects. They were charged with discovering the economic state of the practice in
the Americas on an array of topics, including competition policy, government procure-
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ment, investment, services, standards and technical barriers, subsidies, antidumping and
countervailing duties (FTAA, 1999). Much of this yeoman work was, in reality, given to
the agencies represented in the Trilateral Committee. Its responsibility early on was to
provide technical expertise rather than to negotiate the text of the agreement itself. The
trilateral support of agencies from the Organization of American States (OAS), the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), and the Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) was key to laying the foundation for later negotiations. The
OAS, IDB, and ECLAC studied trade law and searched for commonalities in economic
practice throughout the Americas. A public-private partnership was also an important
part of the process. Business had an important advisory role in the negotiation process.
For example, they along with some governments such as Brazil's heavily promoted what
have been called "business facilitation measures" to get the private sector ready for the
challenges of a FTAA (Lande, 1999, p. 458).
The Santiago Summit in 1998 moved the process even further along. By then, it had
been decided that the FTAA would be "balanced, comprehensive, WTO-consistent." It
would also be negotiated as "a single undertaking" ("Declaration of Santiago: Summit of
the Americas," 1999, p. 4). The United States had bowed to the Latin American view that
the negotiations should be based on an all-parties conference (Feinberg, 1997, p. 139).
However, it disagreed with some Latin American participants about what the "single
undertaking" actually meant. On the other hand, the Plan of Action from the Santiago
Summit was more ambitious and more regimented than some of the Latin American parties wanted (Feinberg, 1997, p. 146). Although trade and economic liberalization were the
primary interests, education, poverty eradication, human rights, and other issues were
tacked onto the FTAA process.
The FTAA had become the centerpiece for setting new rules for the hemisphere's political economy. However, complex negotiations on many levels were also being pursued in
the Americas. This "cascading modular multilateralism" involved bilateral negotiations as
well as "geographic based pluralilateralism" and issue specific coalition building
(Feinberg, 1997, p. 103; Morton, 1999, p. 249). By 2000, it was clearly the case that the
FTAA process was only plodding ahead at a very slow pace. Some progress at the technical
level had not been matched by a great deal of interest at the political level. What is more,
interest in the FTAA varies among the thirty-four states. By 2000, most of the principal
players, including North America ones, had not yet become very interested in the FTAA.
U.S. and Mexican interest was middling at best. Among the NAFTA members, only
Canada was greatly interested in the FTAA (Morton, 1999, p. 254, Table 2). After all, the
process was in the early stages and, without "fast track authority," the United States was in
a weakened position to persuade the other potential FTAA partners to push ahead and to
push harder than they had up to that point. In the south, enthusiasm is also mild, to say
the least. Indeed, Brazil's interest in the FTAA is quite low. Domestic financial volatility
and business adjustment concerns, as well as its ongoing efforts to reach a Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) with the European Union (EU), lead to some concern about Brazil's
genuine commitment to the FTAA. Those most committed early on to the FTAA are a relatively small elite: the trade ministers, working groups, and the private sectors in some of
the countries involved.
U.S. influence was constrained not just by U.S. drift at the highest policy levels. The
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process also revealed some divergences as well as convergences between the United States
and other NAFTA members and between the United States and other FTAA parties. With
a genuine but modest interest in a FTAA, the potential dominance of the United States
was muted in the early stages. If and when the U.S. executive and Congress become fully
engaged, U.S. influence in the FTAA process may grow.
The eventual prospects for a FTAA and the nature of its commitments on key trade
and trade-related issues still does depend more on the United States than on any other
single participant. On the other hand Brazil, and some other Latin American countries
are cautious; if not outright obstructionist. They sought-but failed to get-a less specific
timetable and less accountability in the process (Feinberg, 1997, p. 146). In Brazil, the
FTAA is regarded as a U.S. priority, but MERCOSUR still comes first.
There are other differences as well. Take, for example, the meaning of "single undertaking." The United States and Canada, among others, argued that this phrase allows for partial agreements along the way, leading to an overall deal in the end. This implies that
small steps can be adopted and even implemented before a comprehensive FTAA package
is adopted in 2005. However, Brazil and MERCOSUR stood on the other side of this
issue. For them, "single undertaking" means "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed"
(Morton, 1999, p. 263). This difference over the "early harvest" issue reflects once again
the fact that some U.S. preferences, while they may eventually prevail, are not always
widely shared in the Americas. On this issue, Brazil and MERCOSUR prevailed. After the
completion of the WTO's Uruguay Round, Brazil and some smaller countries in Latin
America are less eager for fast-paced liberalization. Brazilian businesses have not yet
adjusted to the changing economic climate and its export infrastructure needs improvement before they can become more competitive.
The United States also took positions on other issues that met with some resistance.
The U.S. view on smaller economies is that they should play by the same rules as the larger ones. This is classic NAFTA orthodoxy. And yet, Canada dissents from this view. It has
taken the position that the smaller economies in Latin America and the Caribbean should
be given different or special treatment under a FTAA regime (Morton, 1999, p. 263). For
another, the United States predictably took a hard stance on the protection of intellectual
property rights for a FTAA. Canada once again preferred a policy allowing for some
exemptions. Likewise, the United States pushed for antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) provisions in a FTAA, as it did in NAFTA. This was greeted with little
enthusiasm among most of the other parties. Permitting AD and CVD provisions would
allow the United States to keep its domestic trade policies under the 1974 law and it
would help mollify the U.S. Congress whose support is necessary for the United States to
join the FTAA it is hoping to create. However, there is also congressional resistance to
NAFTA's chapter 19 and its extension to the rest of the Americas. Chapter 19 allows trilateral panels to review and even overrule domestic trade decisions by a majority vote. Some
regard this as a constitutional issue for the United States.
The service sector is another point of difference. The United States insisted on
NAFTA's approach for liberalizing the service sector. Using the "positive" approach,
NAFTA allows liberalization of service sectors unless they are specifically proscribed. This
is what the United States would like to see incorporated within the FTAA. Several South
American countries as well as Costa Rica took this point of view. But not everyone agrees.
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The WTO-sponsored approach, codified in the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), is favored by MERCOSUR. It adopts the "listing" approach in which only those
sectors of the service economy that are specifically mentioned would be liberalized under
the terms of the FTAA text.
The intriguing paradox of the U.S. position on a FTAA lies elsewhere, however. It is simply
this: the official U.S. position is usually very liberal in the sense of preferring the least intervention by the state in markets. The wealthiest state by far in the Americas is, therefore, the
most ardent in its positions on making the FTAA a very liberal RIA. However, it is the United
States that also insists on raising social adjustment issues such as labor and environmental
standards within the FTAA and refuses to abandon domestic trade policies such as
antidumping. Traditionally, labor and environmental provisions have not been included in
trade agreements. NAFTA changed all that, at least for the United States. Labor unions and
some environmentalists are adamant in their resistance to FTAs that do not speak to the
social and adjustment costs of liberalization. In other words, the FTAA may provide relatively
small macroeconomic gains for many throughout the Americas in the long run but it may
impose immediate, relatively high costs of reduced employment and incomes on the backs of
a fairly small and largely defenseless group of U.S. unskilled or semi-skilled workers.
However, this U.S. position that labor and environmental provisions should be a part of the
FTAA was not widely shared. In fact, the technical issues facing the working groups of the
FTAA did not include labor and environment.

III. The Leadership Conundrum.
U.S. economic dominance of Latin America rests upon an overwhelming asymmetry
of power. Hegemony in the Americas, especially in the Caribbean Basin and Central
America, remains a fact of life for most of the states. Even so, the structural power of
hegemonic domination was only part of the story. At the beginning of the twenty-first
century, structural power provides the context for influencing the management of the
political economy of the hemisphere but it no longer-if it ever did-constitutes the only
avenue for U.S. dominance. On the issue of the FTAA, structure and policy must be
bonded together if the U.S. policy leaders hope to secure a dominant position for the
United States.
The classic structural asymmetries remain formidable. The U.S. economy accounted
for eighty-eighty percent of the NAFTA group in 1997; in that same year, it accounted for
seventy-three percent of all of the Americas (see Table 1). It not only has the largest market but it is by far the wealthiest one in the Americas. Although Canada is ranked number
one on the Human Development Index, while the United States ranks third behind
Norway, Canada's smaller population and lower income figures do little to erode U.S.
hegemony. The U.S. population constitutes 34.2 percent of the total population of the
Americas with a GDP per capita of $27,620 (in 1997) and a real GDP per capita (PPP) of
$29,010. By way of contrast, Latin America (including Mexico) had sixty-one percent of
the population, with an average GDP per capita of $2,049 and a real GDP per capita of
$6,868. With the second largest economy in the Americas, Brazil nevertheless ranks below
Mexico and all three of its other MERCOSUR members in real GDP per capita.
What partially dilutes U.S. structural power in South America is U.S. trade patterns. In
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other words, dominance is diluted due to the diversification of exchange away from the
United States. U.S. trade and investment in the Americas is mostly with North America.
Canada and Mexico are its top two trading partners (see Table 2). U.S. trade ties to the
rest of the hemisphere are far weaker. U.S. exports to the world reveal that most of Latin
America, including Brazil, accounts for about seven percent. For its part, MERCOSUR
sells twenty-seven percent of its total exports to the European Union, seventeen percent
to the United States, and five percent to Japan while importing twenty-three percent from
the United States and twenty-six percent from the EU (Carranza, 1999, p. 26). The potential growth of greater U.S.-Latin American trade is what is enticing rather than the contemporary patterns of trade. Even so, in absolute or relative terms, it may not be very
large. During most of the 1990s, trade growth within MERCOSUR or between MERCOSUR and the rest of the Americas was far more important than it was for the United
States, the EU, or NAFTA (IRELA, 1999, p. 36, Table 2).
While structural power is important, so too are two other elements of power: the "soft
power" of economic liberalism and the use of leadership to affect outcomes. U.S. influence depends partially upon an inter-American convergence around liberal market ideas
and trade policy preferences of the United States. In other words, if Latin American leaders agree with the United States on the principles and disciplines it advocates in the FTAA
process, U.S. dominance is more assured. That is not to be taken for granted, however.
This is where bargaining could become very important. Inducements from the north may
be required to get Latin American acceptance of some U.S. preferences. In other words,
the Americas are converging around political and economic liberalization. The U.S. preference is that they converge also around U.S. positions on specific issues such as competition policy, dispute settlement, government procurement, intellectual property, investment, market access, rules of origin (ROOs) and customs procedures, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, services, small economies, technical standards, subsidies, antidumping and countervailing duties.
U.S. leadership on the FTAA could prove crucial for a U.S.-led FTAA or for a FTAA at
all. Without it, the FTAA may come to naught, become sidetracked or delayed as a Pan
American effort at economic regionalism. However, it is exactly on the leadership issue
that U.S. dominance of the FTAA may be most vulnerable. In the Americas, the United
States is the great state, more or less still a hegemon or at least in many cases a dominant
player. But within the United States, at the dawn of the century, the national policy community is divided over the political and social costs of free trade. The irony is that the
United States is strong in the hemisphere but weak at home on this particular issue. The
politicization of free trade, before and after Seattle, ensures that future free trade agreements may be hard to negotiate let alone ratify.
Domestic factors within the United States still do favor free trade agreements. Free
trade and some of the subsidiary issues surrounding it have entered a pantheon of legitimate policy preferences. Presidential support is a given, regardless of partisan leanings.
Free trade itself is not the issue. Rather, the difficulty comes in North America when free
trade and the market orientation that most FTAs endorse collide with political concerns
over immediate distribution of gains and losses. In other words, economic liberalization,
through regionalization and globalization, has brought with it the backlash of a highly
charged political contest (Rodrik, 1998).
Resistance to free trade agreements is most acute for the largest trading state of them
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all, the state that has the most to gain in absolute macroeconomic terms from creating a
broader RIA in the Americas. The most serious domestic hurdle for a strong U.S. role in
forging a favorable FTAA with its southern neighbors is the U.S. Congress. It is severely
cross-pressured and this could be very important for future support on economic integration through FTAs (Destler, 1998, p. 143). The failure of the Clinton administration to
get "fast track authority" from Congress for FTAA negotiations in 1997 and 1998 certainly
reduced the credibility of U.S. leadership over the FTAA process. Backed by the perception that NAFTA had negatively affected those least able to compete in a more open
regional free market, House Democrats essentially stood in the way of the Democratic
president's efforts to revive "fast track authority" for future agreements (Barnes and
Cohen, 1997, pp. 2304-2305). Clinton's attempt to reach a consensus with congressional
Republicans misfired because it managed to increase Democratic antagonism to Clinton's
legislative agenda. The "fast track" bill (HR 2621) got more Republican support than it
did Democratic support. House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-Missouri) insisted
on strong provisions for labor and environmental standards in the "fast track" authorization. Clinton and the Republicans could not-or would not-meet these demands.
What is more, Clinton's coalition of moderates offended liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans alike on a whole host of legislative issues, including this one. With only
about one-fifth of the House Democrats in favor of fast track, the bill was pulled from the
agenda before it actually came to a vote (Taylor, 1997, pp. 2828-2830). The failure of the
free trade coalition in Congress during the late 1990s to gain "fast track" authority for the
president was obviously a setback-but perhaps not a fatal one-for negotiating the
FTAA. After all, the eight years of the Uruguay Round of GATT began without U.S. "fast
track" authority. The disturbances in Seattle were a "wake up call' according to President
Clinton, for all those who believe that free trade can be advanced without gaining the
support of these "new voices" (Kahn, 2000, p. A6).
The politicization in Seattle also reflected the president's failure to move the WTO
process forward. But it also implied something else. There may be the possibility of a twolevel negotiating game. On the one hand, the president was making a bow toward the
domestic realities in an election year. He commented sympathetically in Seattle about the
concerns of the protestors and demonstrators. In doing this, the United States was also
sending a message to many states about the relative strength of the United States in the
negotiating process. Domestic division may not be only a weakness, however. A contrarian view would see the struggle over free trade as a two-level game in which U.S. leadership in the Americas could gain strength from its domestic politics. The domestic struggle
over free trade and labor standards could be used as a wedge to influence potential trade
partners. If Latin American states want a FTAA bad enough, U.S. politics could be the
lever to extract further concessions. In fact, at the WTO meeting in Seattle, India and
other countries regarded the U.S. position in sympathy with the demonstrators as a ploy
to design future trade agreements that would allow the United States to use trade sanctions against trade partners by invoking provisions on labor and environmental standards. This was seen as U.S. "protectionism in the guise of idealism" by many global
South members of the WTO (Dugger, 1999, p. C4).
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IV. The MERCOSUR Strategy.
Although the United States retains a lopsided advantage in structural power, this does
not guarantee in and of itself a blank check in the FTAA process. The diversity and complexity of Latin America is more daunting after decades of uneven development than it
was in Bolivar's era almost two centuries ago. This makes a FTAA an inherently more
problematic venture than NAFTA was. Latin American countries are individualistic about
specific policies and some may not even have policies in areas identified in the FTAA
process. While many may go along because they fear being left out or behind, the capability of the United States to move an entire region toward a FTAA in the time allotted for it
may be sorely tested. NAFTA was difficult enough to devise; despite or because of that
precedent, the FTAA may be even more arduous.
Just as NAFTA is the legal and symbolic adhesive for North American regionalism, so
too have various subregional RIAs in South America been pursuing their own paths to
economic liberalization and free trade. The Andean Community (AC), the Central
American Common Market (CACM), and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in
addition to MERCOSUR are the principal Latin American RIAs most interested in the
FTAA process. Except possibly for MERCOSUR, these subregional RIAs are not generally
staking out positions cum blocs in the FTAA process so far, but the FTAA process has
helped to solidify the subregional RIAs (Morton, 1999, p. 271). However, internal strains
within MERCOSUR may complicate things. The Brazilian devaluation in 1999 had serious consequences for monetary stability and bloc unity (Gruben, 2000: 9). Despite everything, Pan American and Bolivaran visions will probably coexist in the Americas for some
time to come.
The subregionalism of MERCOSUR poses the most important challenges and opportunities for creating a FTAA under terms acceptable to the United States. MERCOSUR
was conceived in the beginning as a counterweight to the RIA from the north and as a
lever against rushing headlong toward a Pan American approach dominated by the
United States. On the other hand, genuine access to U.S. markets for Brazil's manufactured exports is a potent attraction. The pull of economic inducements and the resistance
to domination leads to a situation in which Brazil and its bloc seek to blend a strategy of
"balancing" and "bandwagoning." Once again, subregional issues may complicate matters.
For example, the dollarization of the Argentine economy might compromise monetary
sovereignty and thereby increase the South's dependence on the United States (Gruben,
2000: 13). Brazil would like a FTAA on the most favorable terms possible but it also wants
to check U.S. dominance by linking up with other trade partners.
As has already been mentioned, MERCOSUR staked out opening positions on the
process and the nature of the FTAA that are at variance with some positions taken by the
United States. Singly or taken together, these divergences do not represent points of disagreement fatal to a successful outcome. Still, they do reflect an approach to the FTAA
that is not shared in the north, or at least not initially. Basically, led by Brazil, MERCOSUR is more cautious, suspicious, and reluctant about a FTAA, especially one that reflects
too closely U.S. preferences. Brazil generally subscribes to the view that there is danger in
moving prematurely toward a FTAA. This is especially significant in light of the fact that
Brazil and MERCOSUR are less willing or ready to support U.S. positions on issues dealing with regulatory policy, the service sector, intellectual property rights, and labor and
environmental provisions, to name the most contentious.
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Brazilian leaders also regard their state as counterweight to the United States. For
Brazil, MERCOSUR is its instrument of geoeconomic strategy for balancing off the influence of the United States in the southern cone. Rather than jump on the bandwagon of a
NAFTA-inspired FTAA, Brazil embraced a more distant but still engaged approach to the

Pan American vision of a twenty-first century FTAA. In this political interpretation of
Brazil's involvement in the FTAA, the EU has a place. The EU is Brazil's main trading
partner. The possible EU-Brazil FTA would therefore reinforce important trading relationships and it would allow Brazil to use the EU as a balance against a dominant U.S.
role in the FTAA. The net effect of the EU agreement on Brazil would probably be greater
than would that of the FTAA (IRELA, 1999: 13). Still, trade is growing quickly between

the United States and Brazil. Brazilian manufactured exports are particularly important
to the NAFTA countries. The most obvious option for Brazil is to use its dominance within MERCOSUR to blend hemispheric and extra-hemispheric strategies. MERCOSUR
could develop a triangular relationship between the NAFTA and EU blocs to gain relatively more from each. Trade, credibility, and international bargaining positions could be
enhanced with a FTA with the EU. It may also be a way to increase pressure and extract
concessions from the United States on key sectors such as agriculture and textiles (IRELA,
1999, p. 8).

V. Gains, Markets, and States.
The FTAA is an intriguing test of the idea that the United States can dominate the
making of rules under which the economies of Americas will move closer together.
Whether the United States will dominate or merely influence the eventual FTAA is just as
much open to debate as is the extent to which U.S. power can shape the national
economies of the south more generally. One should also refrain from the premature view
that the process itself cannot lead to movement on issues and positions. Different positions on issues may not always be imbedded in stone nor do they necessarily suggest that
different positions will always be incompatible.
Although power in its various guises may go a long way to determining what comes out of
this complex process, the eventual fate of the FTAA and of the Americas as a more united
region also hinges on promises and fears about expected gains and losses. Absolute gains is
the growth of the pie; relative gains is who gets a bigger slice. Both are germane to interAmerican relations in the early twentieth century just as they are for states throughout the
world. Some states, firms, and workers, among others, would take a larger pie even if their
slices were smaller than others. This is where politics and economics meet. In the FTAA,
there is also the question of states and markets. If almost everyone gains a little, but a few lose
or have to pay more for the gains than do others, then these differentials may affect the
process of state-led economic regionalism. What is more, if a FTAA promises absolute gains
at the price of greater U.S. dominance, how great must the gains be to make them worth the
political price to be paid? Just as war is too important to be left entirely to the generals, free
trade is apparently too important to be left entirely to the exporters.
The potential for U.S. dominance in Latin America through the creation of a FTAA is
ultimately anyone's guess. The premise that the wealthy and the powerful benefit more
from unfettered markets would lead one to believe that U.S. dominance would indeed be
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enhanced under certain conditions. This would mean that states would bandwagon on
U.S.-preferred rules if the promise of absolute and relative gains outweighs the risks of
greater vulnerability to U.S. dominance.
The NAFTA experience, incomplete as it is, may offer some insight. While some have
lost, or at least not gained as much as others, the macroeconomic impact has been slightly
positive for NAFTA members. With major asymmetries in place, the temptation might
have been to assume that the "wealthy get wealthier" and the "poor get poorer." A FTAA
may have little impact on these gains, but the possibility that it will makes this issue one
that could affect the eventual prospects for a Pan American approach to regional integration. There is something else at stake as well. The complex web of structure, exchange,
soft power, and leadership makes any FTAA a creature of political as well as economic
concerns. One cannot assume that whatever shape the FTAA does take, U.S. dominance
over Latin America will change a great deal one way or the other. However, the perception
that it might change is linked to the promise and fear of greater exchange in an uncertain
but still asymmetric region. There is nothing inevitable about the destiny of U.S. dominance in the Americas just as there is nothing inevitable about the prospects for a more
integrated and prosperous hemisphere.

TABLE 1
POPULATION AND INCOME, 1997
POPULATION

GDP

GDP/CAPITA

REAL GDP/CAP

NAFTA
United States
Canada
Mexico

271.8
30.3
94.3

$7,834.0
607.7
403.0

$27,620
16,525
1,910

$29,010
22,480
8,370

MERCOSUR
Brazil
Argentina
Paraguay
Uruguay

163.7
35.7
2.7
3.3

820.4
325.0
10.2
20.0

2,107
4,021
1,047
2,992

6,480
10,300
7,168
9,200

Chile
Bolivia

10.3
7.8

77.1
8.0

2,667
244

12,770
2,880

Venezuela
Other LAC
All LAC

27.8

87.5

2,685

8,860

144.5
489.9

820.0
2,169.0

2,049

6,868

Note: Population (1997), in millions; GDP (1997) in U.S. billions; GDP/capita (1997) in 1987 U.S. dollars;
Real GDP/capita (1997) is PPP U.S. dollars.
SOURCE: United Nations Development Program (1999), pp. 136; 152-154; 184-187; 197-199.
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TABLE 2
SHARE OF U.S. EXPORTS TO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
AS A PERCENTAGE OF U.S. EXPORTS TO THE WORLD, 1994
North America
Canada
Mexico
MERCOSUR
Brazil
Argentina
Paraguay
Uruguay
Other Latin America
Chile
Dominican Republic
Andean Pact
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Venezuela
Bolivia
Central American Common Market
Costa Rica
Guatemala

Percent
22.29
9.92

1.58
0.87
_

0.54
0.54

0.79
0.23
0.27
0.78

0.36
0.26

SOURCE: Calculated from International Monetary Fund
(1995), pp. 436-438; 261-263.
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